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Abstract 
A usual interpretation of the high performance of the German economy since 2005 is that the 
Hartz labour market reforms have boosted German competitiveness, resulting in higher 
exports, higher production and lower unemployment. This explanation is at odds with the 
sequence of observed facts. We propose and model an alternative scenario in which 
offshoring explains the gains in competitiveness but increases unemployment and inequality, 
and the subsequent labour market reforms lower unemployment by lessening the reservation 
wage and expanding the non-tradable sector. The model replicates the developments of the 
German economy since 1995: 1) Germany offshores more intensively than other advanced 
countries; 2) The increase in competitiveness and in the exports/production ratio occurs 
before the implementation of the labour market reform, and this comes with both higher 
inequality and higher unemployment; 3) The implementation of the reform reduces 
unemployment, but also decreases the exports/production ratio and increases inequality. The 
model also predicts that the reduction in unemployment in Germany would have occurred 
without the Hartz reforms, but later and less intensively. We finally discuss the possible 
extension of this ‘strategy’ to other Eurozone countries, and alternative policies that activate 
similar mechanisms without increasing inequality.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the mid-2000s, Germany has exhibited better economic results than most European 
countries. Growth has been higher, unemployment has continuously diminished, budget 
deficits and public debt have decreased and are now significantly lower than the European 
average levels. Above all, the German performance on external markets has been particularly 
beneficial since Germany has accumulated substantial trade surpluses and maintained its 
international market share, in contrast with all advanced economies whose market shares have 
narrowed because of the increasing weight of emerging countries. Finally, unlike all advanced 
economies, the decrease in unemployment has been continuous since 2005, with almost no 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis on this reduction.  
The turning point occurred in the mid-2000s. In the late 1990s-early 2000s, Germany was 
considered as ‘the sick man’ in Europe (e.g., Economist, 2004), with low growth, high and 
increasing unemployment, budget deficits and public debt. Most German economic indicators 
began to improve in 2006, i.e., one year after the final setting of the Hartz reforms. 
Implemented from 2003 up to 2005, the four stages of the Hartz reform aimed at lowering 
unemployment and increasing German competitiveness by making labour more flexible and 
inciting unemployed workers to participate in the labour market.   
The coincidence of the German recovery with the implementation of Hartz laws has led 
most observers to explain the German success by the following sequence. The Hartz reforms 
have increased labour flexibility, reduced wages and boosted German competitiveness, 
resulting in both higher exports and higher production, and finally lower unemployment. A 
virtuous circle has then emerged in which higher exports, production and employment have 
lessened public deficit and debt, which prevented Germany from setting the restrictive fiscal 
policy followed by most European countries, which has in turn resulted in higher growth 
compared to the rest of Europe.1  
Unfortunately, this interpretation does not coincide with observed facts. The core of the 
explanation is the impact of Hartz reforms on wage moderation, competitiveness and exports, 
which would have boosted production and employment. But the increase in competitiveness 
and exports occurred over the period 1993-2005, i.e., before the setting of Hartz laws. After 
2005, German exports in percent of GDP as well as the exports/imports ratio have decreased, 
in contradiction with the aforementioned interpretation. Moreover, the most striking result of 
the Hartz reforms is the huge increase in atypical employment. 
This paper provides an alternative explanation that combines offshoring and labour market 
reforms to explain the German experience. The scenario is as follows. Facing higher labour 
cost than other advanced countries, German firms have relocated the (low skilled) labour-
intensive stages of production to low-wage countries, particularly Central European countries, 
this relocation being much more pronounced in the  German case compared to other European 
countries. This has (i) increased the competitiveness of German products in foreign markets, 
raising thereby German exports, (ii) increased the unemployment of unskilled workers in 
Germany, and (iii) increased inequality by driving down the wages of the unskilled. The 
impact upon growth was negative in a first stage because (i) of growing unemployment and 
(ii) the increase in exports was to a large extent based on offshoring, i.e., composed of 
imported parts. Confronted with the offshoring-related increase in unemployment, the 
German government introduced the Hartz reforms whose key implication was the promotion 
of low paid jobs in non-tradable services. This policy has reduced unemployment, but this has 
come with the increase in non-standard employment and with growing inequality and in-work 
poverty. Finally, the increasing demand for German goods due to higher competitiveness has 
                                                     
1 Arguments along these lines can, e.g., be found in Kirkegaard (2014) and Rinne & Zimmermann (2013). 
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subsequently boosted production in the segments located in Germany, implying a further 
increase in employment.    
We develop a general equilibrium framework that replicates the aforementioned scenario 
and provides a modelling of the German experience (outsourcing + labour market reform). 
The GE model does not aim at capturing all the dimensions of the German macroeconomic 
experience since the mid-nineties. Its goal is to analyse the impact on the German economy of 
the combination of, and interplay between, offshoring and labour market reforms, and to 
verify that these mechanisms provide a reliable picture of the major characteristics of the 
German economy over this period.  The model comprises three sectors and three countries. 
The three countries are Germany, other advanced economies (labelled ‘North’) and the 
‘South’. The South displays a comparative advantage in low skill intensive productions. There 
is one skill-intensive sector which comprises two goods differentiated according to their 
country of origin (‘Armington’s hypothesis’), Germany and North, and produced from two 
segments, one utilising skilled labour and the other unskilled labour. The ‘unskilled’ segment 
can be offshored, but offshoring has a cost which decreases with time (globalisation). Another 
sector is unskilled-intensive and its production is fully located in the South. Finally, a non-
tradable unskilled-intensive service is produced in each country. We start from an initial 
situation in which the offshore production cost is large enough to maintain the whole 
production of the skill-intensive sectors in Germany and North. The subsequent continuous 
decrease in this cost results in offshoring to the South of the unskilled-intensive segment of 
the German skill-intensive good. We analyse the impact of offshoring by assuming a 
reservation wage in Germany, and then a decrease in this reservation wage due to labour 
market reforms.    
In contrast with the usual explanation based on the impact of wage limitation upon German 
competitiveness on external markets, the results of our model reproduce the main 
characteristics of the German experience since the mid-nineties. The fact that Germany 
outsources before and more intensively than other countries is an endogenous finding of the 
model. In addition, the model replicates the sequence of observed facts. In particular, it 
explains the increase in the exports/GDP ratio before the Hartz reforms and its decrease 
afterwards, as well as the fact that the rise in the skill premium and in the cost of unskilled 
labour began before the implementation of these reforms. We also find that the decrease in 
unemployment would have occurred even without the Hartz laws, but later and less 
intensively. Finally, by showing that the decline in unemployment is essentially based on the 
development of non-tradables, the model provides a useful starting point to discuss alternative 
pro-employment policies. 
The stylised facts and the related literature are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
general framework of the model, the analysed scenario and the modelling strategy. Section 4 
describes the equilibria corresponding to each stage of our scenario. Section 5 exposes the 
results of the simulations implemented from an extended version of the model. The main 
findings are discussed in Section 6 and we conclude in Section 7. 
   
2. Facts and literature 
 
2.1. Economic outcomes in Germany and Eurozone countries 
 
Comparing the German economy with that of other European and advanced countries since 
1995 leads to a clear distinction between two phases (Figure 1). From 1995 to 2005, the 
German economic performance was below those of most advanced countries: growth was 
lower and unemployment was higher. In contrast, from 2006 onwards, Germany has exhibited 
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 The economic analysis of international offshoring has known a critical development since 
the early nineties. Theoretical and empirical works on the subject are many (reviews by Crino, 
2009, Chang, 2012 and Chusseau & Dumont, 2013).  
 There is now a rather large literature dealing with the impact of offshoring upon wages and 
labour demand in Germany. The early work by Falk & Koebel (2002) showed no impact on 
the demand for unskilled workers, but this result is questionable from a methodological point 
of view (Geishecker & Görg, 2008) and, maybe more important, it concerns the period 1978-
1990 in which offshoring to emerging countries was limited. More recent studies typically 
diagnose a significant negative impact upon both the demand for unskilled workers and their 
pay (Geishecker, 2006; Becker et al., 2006; Geishecker & Görg, 2008; Braun & Scheffel, 
2007).  
 Dustmann et al. (2014) and Bonin (2012) suggest that the decentralization of wage setting 
since the early 1990s and the introduction of ‘opening clauses’ in industry-level collective 
agreements may be attributed to the credible threat of offshoring to central and eastern 
European countries. Both works argue that the rising flexibility of the German industrial 
relations had led to wage moderation and to an increase in competitiveness long before the 
Hartz reforms. Dustman et al. (2014) also point out that the offshoring intensity in Germany 
increased far more than that in other European countries. For example, in 2000, imported 
inputs from Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics amounted to about 8.5 
percent of inputs in Germany, compared to only 2.5 percent in Italy and 1.9 percent in France. 
Higher German offshoring dynamics compared to other large European economies is 
confirmed by Timmer et al. (2013).   
The growing offshoring of unskilled-intensive stages of production has come with wage 
moderation, rising flexibility and increasing earnings inequality. The German income 
distribution remained quite stable from the seventies up to the mid-1990s (Steiner & Wagner, 
1998; Biewen, 2000; Prasad, 2004). Since then, Germany has experienced a critical increase 
in income inequality and poverty (Gernandt & Pfeiffer 2007, Dustmann et al, 2009; Fuchs-
Schündeln et al. 2010, Antoncyck et al., 2010; Figure 5).  
 Gernandt & Pfeiffer (2007) find that the rise in wage inequality in West Germany from 
1994 to 2005 is essentially attributable to the bottom side of the wage distribution. Dustmann 
et al. (2009) find that wage inequality in West Germany increased at the bottom half of the 
wage distribution from the 1990s onward, but also at the top half from the 1980s. For the 
period 1999-2006, Biewen & Juhasz (2012) find that about one half of the increase in income 
inequality is explained by labour incomes, the other half being equally shared by employment 
changes and changes in the tax system.   
 
2.4. Observed facts and the modelled scenario 
Taken together, the stylized facts and empirical literature exposed above show the plausibility 
of the scenario exposed in the introduction:  
 1) The increase in competitiveness and exports started early in the mid-1990s and can be 
explained by the relocation of the labour-intensive stages of production to low-wage 
countries. This strategy of firms was implemented much more intensively in Germany than in 
other European countries and led to an increase in unemployment and to wage inequality.  
 2) Confronted with rising unemployment, the German government introduced the Hartz 
reforms, thereby promoting the creation of low-paid jobs, especially in non-tradable services.  
 In the next section, we develop a theoretical model based on these facts and we show that 
the so-generated mechanisms replicate the main traits of the German experience. We 
subsequently operate simulations from an extended version of this model. From the 
mechanisms revealed in this scenario, we discuss the possibility and effectiveness for other 
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Eurozone countries to imitate this strategy. Based on the diagnosis that the decrease in 
unemployment essentially derives from the job creation in non-tradable services, we finally 
discuss alternative pro-employment policies that could prevent the most controversial aspect 
of the German experience, i.e., the increase in inequality and poverty.    
 
3. The model 
 
We firstly present the general framework of the model and the offshoring decision. We 
subsequently describe the successive phases of our scenario. We finally expose the modelling 
strategy. 
 
3.1. General framework 
There are three countries: two advanced countries, Germany and North (other advanced 
countries, depicted by a tilde, ), and the South, i.e., emerging countries (depicted by a star*). 
There are two factors, skilled labour (H) and unskilled labour (L). Factor endowments are 
given. The German endowment is  ,H L  and North’s endowment ( , )H L  . We denote H and 
L ( H  and L ) the factor utilisation in Germany (North) that can differ from the factor 
endowment when there is unemployment.  
For the sake of simplicity, the South is assumed to be endowed with unskilled labour only. 
There are three sectors:  
- Sector l provides one homogenous unskilled intensive good (l) which is fully produced by 
the South and imported by both Germany and North. 
- Sector nt utilises unskilled labour only to produce one homogenous non-tradable service 
in each country. 
- The third sector is skill-intensive and produces two tradable goods that are differentiated 
according to Armington’s hypothesis, h being the German variety and h  North’s. Both 
varieties are produced by combining two segments, one using skilled labour only and the 
other unskilled labour only.  
We suppose that the segments utilising unskilled labour may be relocated to the South 
depending on the cost of producing abroad relative to the cost of producing domestically. In 
contrast, the segment utilising skilled labour is always produced in the home country because 
it encompasses the specificities that differentiate the products according to Armington’s 
hypothesis. We finally assume that labour is immobile, i.e., labour mobility costs are 
sufficiently high to prevent migration flows.  
 
3.1.1. Production  
In all countries, the non-tradable service (nt) utilises unskilled labour only with the same 
linear technology: 
nt ntY L  ;  nt ntY L   
Assuming perfect competition in the market for goods and services, the zero-profit 
condition ( nt L nn ttp Y w L  and t nnt n L tYp w L   ) determines the prices of non-tradable services: 
/  ;      /Lnt n Ltp pw w             (1) 
where Lw  ( Lw ) denotes the wage of unskilled labour in Germany (North).  
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The two skill intensive goods (variety h for Germany and h  for North) are produced by 
the same Cobb-Douglas combination of two segments: 
1
h L HY AS S  ; 1L HhY AS S      
Segments LS  and LS  display the same technology which utilises unskilled labour only. 
Symmetrically, HS  and HS  utilise skilled labour only with the same technology: 
                      L h L hS L S L            (2) 
            H h H hS H H S H H             (3)      
 
3.1.2. Demands for goods  
In the three countries, households maximise the same utility function subject to the usual 
income constraint:3  
 1/log log logl l h h nt nthu c ac c c       , 1h l nt      
where ic  is the consumption of good i ,  , , , ,i l h h nt   and 0 1  .  
Coefficients l , h  and nt  are respectively the share of the demand for l, h+ h  and nt in 
the households’ income.  
Coefficient a depicts the demand attractiveness of the German quality h compared to 
North’s quality h . 
 
Good l. Good l is fully produced by the South. The imports of l by advanced countries are: 
 
;                  l l l lM I M I     
where I and I  denote total income in Germany and North, respectively. 
 
Good nt. The non-tradable good is produced by each advanced country for its own 
consumption.  At the macro level, we have (because of the utility function):4 
 
nt nt nt nt ntp Y p c I            (4)
      
nt nt nt nt ntp Y p c I               (5) 
 
Goods h and h . Because of the utility function, the world total expense for the sum of goods 
h and h  is: 
( *)h h h h Wh hp Y p Y I I I I        ,  
with I* being the South’s total income and  *WI I I I     that of the world.  
Utility maximisation determines the world demands for goods h and h , ,dh WY  and ,dh WY  : 
                                                     
3 We only present the German utility function, the utility functions of North and the South being identical.  
4 We do not provide this relation for the South because it is useless for what follows. 
 10
 , , 11 1 ( / )d dh W h Wh W h h W hh h hh
a I a IY p Y
a p pp a p p
 
    
 
          
 , , 11  '1 ( / ) 1d dh W h Wh W h h W hh hh h
I IY p Y
a p pp a p p     
 
             
with 1(1 ) 1      being the elasticity of substitution between goods h and h . 
Finally, the demand for goods h and h  from any country j is: 
, 1( / )
h jd
h h j
h h
a I
p Y
a p p

 

             (6) 
, 1( / ) 1
h jd
h h j
hh
I
p Y
a p p 

             (7) 
with , , *jI I I I   according to the considered country.  
 
3.2. Offshoring  
 
3.2.1. Offshore production costs 
We assume that there are specific costs attached to producing offshore. These comprise 
transportation costs (to move the parts from a production site to another), extra-costs linked to 
low quality public equipment and services in the South, organisational costs (to match 
segments produced in different countries), training cost (to adapt the unskilled manpower to 
the imported technology), political, social and ‘criminal’ costs linked to low property right 
enforcement and corruption in the host country. This also covers the fact that labour 
productivity is typically lower in the South than in advanced countries. 
As Ranjan (2013), we further assume that the cost of producing offshore is decreasing with 
time. This decrease derives from several channels: the decrease in transportation costs, the 
better enforcement of property rights, the improvement in public equipment and collective 
services linked to development, and the positive externalities due to better knowledge and 
insertion in the globalized economy generate a decrease in offshoring costs, etc. 
In what follows, we focus on the offshore production cost of the German segment LS . 
We denote by   the cost per unit of efficient (German-equivalent) unskilled labour in the 
production of segment LS  when this segment is offshored to the South. Hence, producing one 
unit of segment LS  in the South has a cost   for German firms (Eq. 2). 
The dynamics of the cost of producing offshore (henceforth ‘offshore cost’) is then 
depicted by the simple functional form (t denotes time): 
 t  ,  / 0t           (8) 
3.2.2. Offshoring decision  
We denote by NOLw  (NO for ‘no-offshoring’) the German full employment unskilled workers’ 
wage when segment LS  is fully produced in Germany.  
We denote by w  the reservation wage in Germany, which is supposed (i) to be lower than 
NO
Lw : 
NO
Lw w  and (ii) to be positively related to social protection (unemployment and social 
benefits, union bargaining power, redistribution, etc.). 
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than for other firms because of learning-by-doing, on-the-job training, improvement in 
organisation etc.       
 
3.3. The scenario  
 
From the above-described model, we develop the following four-stage scenario.  
1) At the beginning, both advanced countries fully produce their own skill-intensive 
variety (h for Germany and h  for North) because producing the unskilled segments of goods 
h remains more costly in the South than in Germany. In this equilibrium without offshoring, 
the demand for each variety (depending on parameter a) and the countries’ endowments of 
skilled and unskilled labour determine the differences in both the skill premia and wages 
between Germany and North. Given the countries’ characteristics, we show that the skill 
premium is lower, and the wage of unskilled workers higher, in Germany than in North.    
2) As the offshore production cost decreases, there is a time when this cost becomes 
sufficiently low to incite German firms to offshore the unskilled segment of their variety h. 
German firms outsource first because the wage of unskilled labour is higher in Germany. This 
makes the wage of low skilled workers to decrease and the skill premium to increase in 
Germany. As long as the wage of low skilled workers decreases (because the offshore cost 
continues to fall), this causes a move in the German production pattern: the weight of the non-
tradable sector increases (because its relative price decreases) and a growing share of segment 
LS  is offshored.  
3) As the offshore cost continues to decrease, there is a moment when this cost becomes 
lower than the German reservation wage. From then, (i) the whole of the unskilled segment 
LS  is offshored to the South, and (ii) this creates unemployment of the unskilled in Germany.   
4) Facing the increase in unemployment, the German government decides to implement 
labour market reforms that lessen the social net and the reservation wage. This lowers the 
unskilled labour wage and the price of non-tradables, increasing thereby the demand for and 
production of nt, which diminishes unemployment.  
 
3.4. Modelling strategy 
 
The core of the above scenario lies in the decrease in the offshore production cost.  
A first way to model this scenario is to build a complete framework with the three 
countries’ endowments in skilled and unskilled labour being given and to calculate the 
general equilibrium values related to each aforementioned stage. This modelling strategy is 
twice disputable. First, it assumes a given size of the South (given endowments *L and *H ) 
which is at odds with the fact that a growing number of emerging countries have joined the 
globalized economy. Second, it comprises the calculations of all Southern values (production 
of each good, imports and exports, unskilled labour wage, etc.), implying thereby a 
complexity which is not necessary for our scenario which focuses on Germany. Finally, 
correcting the first shortcoming by assuming an increasing size of the South would reinforce 
the second critique. 
In fact, there is a simpler way to model the same scenario. This consists in introducing the 
South through two elements, namely, the exogenously decreasing offshoring cost   and the 
South balanced trade constraint. The latter permits to calculate the Southern total income as a 
linear function of both the German and North total incomes. This modelling strategy 
significantly simplifies the calculations because it allows ignoring the South ‘inside 
equilibrium’, i.e., its unit wage, its equilibrium on the labour market, its production of non-
tradables, and finally its size. As we focus on equilibria in Germany and North, this is the 
strategy we select here. Then the different stages of our scenario can be modelled as follows. 
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We firstly determine the full employment equilibria when offshoring expands. In these 
cases, the German unskilled labour wage Lw  is equal to the offshore production cost   as 
long as offshoring expands until the moment when segment LS  is fully offshored (otherwise, 
there would be unemployment of German unskilled workers). We thus calculate the 
successive full employment equilibria from the situation without offshoring to the situation 
where segment LS  is fully offshored with Lw  . In particular, this permits to define the full 
employment unskilled labour wage with no-offshoring NOLw  and the full employment 
unskilled labour wage with full offshoring FOLw .  
We can then introduce the German reservation wage w  which must lie between NOLw  and 
FO
Lw . The decreasing offshore cost   becomes lower than w  from a certain point in time.  
This leads to full offshoring (because the offshore production cost is lower than the German 
production cost of segment LS ) with unemployment of unskilled workers.  
We finally introduce labour market reforms by making the reservation wage w  decrease. 
It must be noted that the model developed here is limited by construction and cannot 
thereby embrace a large number of specificities of the German experience. In particular, the 
successive equilibria assume balanced trade for the three countries, which cannot account for 
the large surplus of Germany. The impact of the German reunification is ignored. Finally, we 
shall suppose that North remains at full employment throughout the scenario so as to focus on 
the sole impacts of the interplay between offshoring and labour market institutions.  
 
4. Equilibria 
 
4.1. Full employment equilibria  
 
4.1.1. Equilibrium without offshoring in Germany 
 
Germany and North are at full employment. We also suppose that the cost of producing the 
unskilled-intensive segment is higher in Germany than in the South. Consequently, there is no 
offshoring.  
We further assume the following two characteristics of the German economy: 
1. The German relative endowment in skilled labour is higher than that of North. In fact, 
the proportion of workers with a tertiary degree within the working population is slightly 
lower in Germany compared to the rest of advanced countries, but the share of workers with 
post-secondary non-tertiary degree is substantially higher. This last characteristic corresponds 
to a specificity of the German education system in which in-the-firm apprenticeship has a 
significant weight. All in all, this shows that the German relative endowment in skilled labour 
is slightly higher than that of North, i.e.:    
H H
L L
             (9) 
2. The following condition is met:  
(1 )( 1)
1/ /
/
L H La
H LL
  
 
          
 
         (10) 
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Condition (10) establishes a relationship between (i) the demand attractiveness of the 
German quality, a, (ii) the relative endowment in skilled labour in both advanced countries, 
/
/
H L
H L
 
, and (iii) the size of Germany in relation to North, /L L . In this relation,  1//a L L  
corresponds to an attractiveness of the German good which is sufficiently high compared to 
the size of Germany. The full significance of Condition (10) is explained further on.   
The full employment general equilibrium without offshoring is built in Appendix A. This 
equilibrium is characterised by the following values of the skill premia and of the wage of 
unskilled workers in Germany in relation to North: 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
NO
nt
Lw
H
 
  
            (11) 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
NO
nt
Lw
H
 
  
   
          (12) 
/
/
NO
NO
w L H
w L H
             (13) 
(1 )( 1)1/
/
/
NO
L
NO
L
L H La
w L H L
w
 

            

         (14) 
where NOLw  ( NOLw ) and NOw  ( NOw ) are the unskilled labour wage and the skill premium in 
Germany (North) in the ‘no-offshoring’ (NO) stage of our scenario. 
From the preceding values, we infer the following two propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: At the full employment equilibrium without offshoring, the skill premium is 
lower in Germany than in North. 
 
Proof. From (9) and (13).  
 
Proposition 2: At the full employment equilibrium without offshoring, the wage of unskilled 
workers is higher in Germany than in North. 
 
Proof. From (10) and (14). 
 
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is straightforward: the skill premium is lower in Germany 
because of the German higher relative skill endowment.   
As regards Proposition 2, three mechanisms combine to raise the wage of unskilled 
workers in Germany in relation to North: 
1. A high coefficient a makes the German quality h to be highly demanded in relation to 
North’s quality h . This increases the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in 
Germany, and thereby the German wage for both types of labour.   
2. A higher relative size of North ( /L L ) increases the  supply of both skilled and 
unskilled workers in North in relation to Germany, which increases the German wages for 
both types of labour in relation to North for a given attractiveness coefficient a. 
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3. A higher German skill endowment / /H L H L    signifies a lower relative supply of 
unskilled labour in Germany compared to North. This entails a higher wage of unskilled 
labour in Germany compared to North. 
Mechanism 3 is obvious. Mechanisms 1 and 2 combine so as to determine the wage level 
in one country in relation to the other. If the variety produced by Germany is highly 
demanded (high coefficient a), then the size of Germany must be large enough to provide the 
world market with this good. If it is not the case, the price of this good increases which pushes 
up the German wages. This correspondence between the attractiveness a and the country size 
directly stems from Armington’s hypothesis that states country-specific qualities of goods.  
Proposition 2 can thus be interpreted as follows. The difference in skill endowments           
( / /H L H L   ) results in a higher relative wage of unskilled labour in Germany (Proposition 
1). Thus, to have a wage of unskilled workers higher in Germany than in North, it is sufficient 
the attractiveness of the German quality, a, not to be too low compared to Germany’s size 
(low attractiveness would reduce the relative price of the German quality and thus the wages 
of both skilled and unskilled workers in Germany compared to North). Note that an 
attractiveness of the German quality higher than that of North’s (i.e., a > 1) is not required to 
reach such a result.  
 
4.1.2. Full employment equilibrium with offshoring  
We now suppose that (i) Germany remains at full employment and (ii) the cost   of unskilled 
labour in the offshored segment LS  is lower than 
NO
Lw . As soon as the offshoring cost moves 
below NOLw , German firms begin to outsource segment LS . Then, the German wage Lw  adjusts 
so as to ensure full employment. As long as segment LS  is not fully offshored, the wage 
adjustment imposes equality Lw   to reach full employment. When   attains the value for 
which the German unskilled labour L is fully employed in the sector of non-tradables, then 
the full employment German wage Lw  cuts of from  . In addition: 
 
Proposition 3. In the skill-intensive sector, German firms begin to outsource their unskilled 
segment before North firms. 
 
Proof. As L Lw w  , the deceasing value ( )t  attains Lw before Lw . Hence, German firms 
begin to outsource before North firms.  
 
In what follows, we place ourselves in the situation in which Germany partially offshores 
its segment LS  whereas North still fully produces its quality h . The building of the model 
with full and partial offshoring is exposed in Appendix B and C. The decrease in the cost of 
producing offshore is introduced in the model through a decrease in the relative price / Lw  . 
The results of this modelling lead to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. During the partial offshoring stage with full employment (implying Lw  ), 
the German skill premium increases from NOw  and tends towards the value 
1 nt
FO NO
nt
Lw w
H


   which ensures full employment of unskilled workers in the non-
tradable sector.  
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4.2. Reservation wage, unemployment and labour market reform 
 
We now introduce a reservation wage w  in Germany. This reservation wage is assumed to be 
higher than the unskilled labour wage FOLw  corresponding to the situation in which the non-
tradable sector generates full employment of the unskilled workers. The decrease in the 
offshore production cost   makes this cost to attain the reservation wage w  at a certain point 
in time.  From then, the production of segment LS  is fully offshored to the South, and 
unskilled labour is thus only employed by the non-tradable sector in Germany. Consequently, 
the feature FOLw w  generates unemployment of the unskilled workers in Germany. We can 
then establish propositions 5 and 6:  
 
Proposition 5. Assume a reservation wage w  in Germany such that FOLw w . Then: 
1) Segment LS  is fully offshored and there is an upward jump in unemployment of the 
German unskilled workers as and when the offshore cost   goes below the reservation 
wage w , and the higher w  the higher unemployment.   
2) Unemployment subsequently decreases with the decrease in   . 
3) When w  , then the German skill premium with reservation wage RWw  is lower than 
the skill premium without, and RWw  decreases with the reservation wage w. 
4)  The decrease in the offshore production cost   raises the German skill premium.  
 
Proof.  Appendix D, results D1, D2 and D3. 
 
The explanation for Proposition 5 is as follows. When the offshore cost   goes below the 
reservation wage, the whole production of segment LS  is immediately relocated to the South. 
This generates a one-shot upward jump in German unemployment. From then: 
1) The German skill premium continues to rise with the decrease in   (Proposition 5, 
Feature 4), but the skill premium with reservation wage and unemployment is lower than the 
skill premium that would have arisen without reservation wage (Feature 3). The reason for 
this is simple. The decrease in Lw  is firstly prevented by the reservation wage, which slows 
the rise in the skill premium down. On the other hand, the decrease in   lowers the cost of 
producing h and increases thereby the world demand for h, leading to an increase in the 
demand for German skilled workers and thus a rise in Hw  and in the skill premium.   
2) After the one-shot jump in unemployment, the subsequent continuing decrease in the 
offshore cost   lessens unemployment. This is because, as the decrease in   increases the 
income of skilled workers Hw  (explanation above), their demand for non-tradable services 
augments, which raises the number of unskilled workers employed in sector nt. This is a key 
result because it shows that the decrease in unemployment would have occurred even without 
the reform in the labour market provided that   continues to decrease (discussion hereafter).  
3) A labour market reform that lowers the reservation wage typically lowers 
unemployment (Feature 1). Note that if this reform occurs when the decrease in 
unemployment has begun, both the reform and the decrease in   push unemployment down, 
which creates a substantial gain in employment.  
Hence, unemployment displays an inverted-V curve from the time when   attains w . It 
firstly jumps upward and it subsequently decreases as   goes downwards, this decrease being 
speeded up when the reservation wage is lessened by the labour market reform.  
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Proposition 6. Assume a reservation wage w such that FOLw w . Then:  
1) There is an upward jump in the ratio of exports to production in Germany as and when 
  goes below the reservation wage. 
2) The subsequent decrease in   lessens this ratio. 
3) A labour market reform that decreases w  has no impact on this ratio if full offshoring 
remains and it lessens this ratio in the opposite case. 
 
Proof. Appendix D, result D4, D5 and D6. 
 
The combination of propositions 5 and 6 has several key consequences.  
Firstly, at the moment of the upward jump in unemployment, Germany simultaneously 
displays an upward jump in its exports/production ratio (Proposition 6 Feature 1). 
Subsequently, the decrease in   reduces the exports/production ratio, lessens unemployment 
and augments the skill premium. This decrease in the X/I ratio results from the fact that a 
large share of the exports consists of re-exports of the imported segment LS  the price of 
which is reduced by the decrease in  . Finally, the decrease in the reservation wage w  due to 
the labour market reform reinforces both the decrease in unemployment and the rise in the 
skill premium. As regards the exports/production ratio, the effect of a decrease in w  depends 
on whether this makes a part of LS  to be relocated in Germany or not. The first case 
corresponds to a new reservation wage such that FOLw w     and it results in a decrease in 
exports because of lower trade with the South (due to the lower imports of LS ). In contrast the 
decrease in w  has no impact on the exports/production ratio if segment LS  remains fully 
offshored. 
In short, unemployment and the exports on production ratio are moving in the same 
direction from the time when   attains w , firstly increasing as   goes below w  and 
subsequently decreasing with the  reduction in    and w .        
 
5. Extended model and simulations 
 
The model developed in the preceding two sections is clearly better tailored to explain the 
observed facts than the ‘traditional explanation’ exposed in the introduction. Indeed, (i) the 
increase in the skill premium (inequality), the decrease in the wage Lw  and the increase in the 
exports on production ratio occur before the implementation of the labour market reform, (ii) 
the rise in inequality and in unemployment are simultaneous before the labour market reform, 
and (iii) the decrease in unemployment comes with a decrease in the export/production ratio 
after the reform. All these predictions are consistent with observed facts.  
Nevertheless, the model generates a disputable outcome: the increases in both 
unemployment and the exports/production ratio display one-shot upward jumps whereas they 
persist for several years in the German experience. Hence, the increases in unemployment and 
in inequality never occur at the same time whereas they were simultaneous from 2000 to 
2005. 
These shortcomings obviously derive from two simplifying assumptions, i.e., (i) the 
existence of one skill intensive sector only with thereby one single offshoring cost and (ii) the 
fact that all unskilled workers are identical. These assumptions generate a one-shot rise in 
unemployment and make that rising inequality cannot come with rising unemployment. A 
simple way to smooth the increase in unemployment is to assume several H-utilising sectors 
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with different offshoring costs. This is what we do now by extending the model to the case of 
a continuum of H-utilising goods.6 Such an extension cannot generate simple analytical 
outcomes such as those found above. This is why the extended model is simulated so as to 
reveal variation profiles consistent with observed facts.  
 
5.1. The extended model 
 
We keep the same general framework, except that we assume a continuum of varieties in both 
sectors h  (Germany) and h  (North), with differences in the cost of producing offshore across 
varieties. So as to focus on the sole German experience, we assume as before that North does 
not outsource abroad its segment LS  throughout the analysed period.    
The new extended framework is characterised by two major modifications: 
1. Both sectors h  (in Germany) and h  (in North) comprise a continuum of varieties (the 
German varieties are denoted i and North’s i ) over an interval normalised to 1,  0,1 . Hence, 
the utility function is now: 
 1/1 10 0log log logl l h i nt ntiu c a c di c di c          ,   1h l nt      
This generates the following demand for each German and North variety ( diY  and diY ): 
 1 11 1 10 0d hi i j jip p p dj a p dY j          I ; 
  1 11 1 10 0d hi j ji ip p p dj pY a dj          I  
where ip  (resp. ip ) is the price of the German (North) variety i ( i ) and I  the total income 
of the considered area (  ,  *  or  WI, I I I I ). 
The German and North varieties i are produced with the same technologies as goods h and 
h  in the simple model developed above. We then denote ( )L hiS i L  and ( )H hiS i H  the 
unskilled and skilled segments respectively in the production of variety i of sector h.   
2. In the German sector h, the cost of producing offshore segment LS  (denoted it  for 
variety i at time t) differs across varieties.  
The goods  0,1i  are ranked in ascending order of offshore cost.   
We assume that, at any time t, the offshore cost is linearly increasing in i from t  to 
t t    , i.e.: 
,          0,...,1it t i i        
Suppose that, at time t, the L-segments of the German varieties  0,k  are offshored 
whereas the varieties  ,1k  are fully produced in Germany. This means that the cost of 
                                                     
6 Another way to get the same outcome is to assume heterogeneity between unskilled workers so that they do not 
share either the same reservation wage, or the same productivity. 
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producing offshore segment LS  for good k is exactly equal to the cost of producing it in 
Germany, i.e., to the unskilled labour wage Lw . Hence: 
 kt t Lt t Ltk w w k             
And (t is omitted for the sake of simplification): 
( ) ( ) ,                0,...,1Li w k i i           (15) 
The varieties with offshored segments LS  are those with an offshore cost   lower than the 
cost of producing LS  in Germany Lw ( ( ) ( )L Li w k i w      for variety i). Consequently, 
the decrease in t  can be modelled as an increase in k, i.e., in the number of varieties with 
segment LS  being offshored. 
            
5.2. Modelling and simulation strategy 
 
From the above-described assumptions, we determine the general equilibrium values for 
Germany and North (skill premia, nominal and real unskilled labour wages, rate of 
unemployment and ratio of exports to total income), corresponding to the following four 
phases: 
1) Phase NO: No offshoring of any German segment ( )LS i  and full employment in 
Germany. In this case, (0) NOLw  , where 0 is the German variety with the lowest offshore 
cost and NOLw the German unskilled labour wage at full employment with no offshoring. 
2) Phase OFE: We subsequently calculate the general equilibrium values in the situation 
where Germany remains at full employment and offshores a growing number of segments 
( )LS i . This corresponds to the lowest offshore cost (0)  lower than NOLw  and to a growing 
number of varieties i with an offshore cost lower than the full employment unskilled labour 
wage in Germany. As indicated above, this is modelled by making k increase from 0 to 1 with 
(i) varieties  0,k  having their segments ( )LS i  offshored, (ii) varieties  ,1k  having their 
segments ( )LS i  produced in Germany, (iii) ( ) ( ) ( )
OFE
Li w k k i     and (iv) ( )OFELw k
ensuring full employment in Germany. 
3) Phase RW: We then select a value of the reservation wage w  between NOLw  and 
 1OFELw , and we calculate the general equilibrium with reservation wage for the k such that 
( )OFELw k w . This generates unemployment of unskilled workers.  
4) Phase HR: We finally introduce the labour market (Hartz) reforms by assuming a 
decrease in the reservation wage that moves from w  to 'w w .  
The simulation of the last phase (corresponding to the implementation of the Hartz 
reforms) requires additional assumptions on (i) the offshoring behaviour of firms and (ii) the 
rhythm at which the reservation wage decreases. A limit situation is when (i) the reservation 
wage decrease is one-off, and (ii) all German firms whose offshore production cost is higher 
than the new reservation wage decide to ‘in-shore’, i.e., to relocate in Germany their segment 
LS , even if they will soon move it back again to the South as the offshore cost continues to 
decrease. These assumptions can be considered as extreme because (i) the Harts reforms have 
been implemented over several years, which shows that the decrease in the reservation wage 
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has been spread out, and (ii) the fact that firms that have offshored their L-segment can bring 
it back to Germany and offshore it again later is rather unlikely. This is because there are 
fixed costs of both offshoring and ‘in-shoring’ (not accounted for in our model) that render 
these moves non-profitable. Our simulation strategy will thus be twofold. We shall firstly 
calculate the values corresponding to a one-shot decrease in the reservation wage with 
relocation of LS  to Germany for all firms with an offshore cost lower that the new reservation 
wage. This corresponds to the extreme and unrealistic scenario just described. For each 
variable, we shall secondly draw the line that joins the value corresponding to the former 
reservation wage at the moment when this reservation wage starts changing and the value 
corresponding to the moment when k = 1 (full offshoring of unskilled intensive segments) for 
the new reservation wage. The latter corresponds to the combination of a lack of in-shoring 
with a smooth decrease in the reservation wage.             
The systems of equation corresponding to the first three cases are described in Appendix E 
and their construction is available from the authors upon request.         
 
5.3. Parameters 
 
Table 1 depicts the values of the parameters utilised in the simulations and Table 2 the factor 
endowments. the unskilled labour wage in North Lw  is taken as numéraire.  
 
Table 1. The model’s parameters 
l  h  nt    A     a  
0.25 0.35 0.4 0.25 1 2 1 0.4 
 
Table 2. Factor endowments and wages 
L  H  L  H  Lw  w  'w     
7.5 2.5 55 15 1 1 0.8 0.3503 
 
The ,   , ,j j h l nt  , are selected so as to broadly represent the share of traditional goods, 
durables goods and ‘new’ industries, and non-tradable services in total demand. Of course, 
these values are very partial because a lot of sectors and public services (health, education, 
justice and police etc.) are not accounted for. As most of the publicly provided services are 
(very) skill-intensive and given that the public manpower represents between 15% and 20% 
of the working population in most advanced countries, we have reduced the amount of skilled 
workers by about 20% in relation to what was observed in Germany and North in the late 
1990s. Coefficient   is equal to 0.25, which shows that the share of less skilled workers in 
the total income paid by sectors h and h  is 1/4. The labour productivity in sector nt is 1  . 
This unit value permits to simplify the calculations without affecting the results since the 
share of sector nt in total expenditure is unchanged and equal to 40%. Coefficient a is chosen 
so as to verify Condition (10) and to have a wage of unskilled workers in Germany that is 
30% higher than in North. 
Factor endowments are such that (i) Germany accounts for 12.5% of the total labour force 
in advanced economies, and (ii) Germany is slightly better endowed with skill labour than 
North. The unskilled labour wage in North is chosen as numeraire and the reservation wage is 
assumed to be initially lower than NOLw  by about 30%, and to be reduced by 20% when the 
labour market reform is achieved. Finally, we suppose that the difference between the lowest 
and the highest offshore cost,  ,  is equal to 30% of the wage NOLw .  
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5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Initial values (no-offshoring, scenario NO) 
Table 3 depicts the model values at the starting point, i.e., with full employment and no-
offshoring in Germany (i.e., the offshore cost is higher than the unskilled workers wage).  
As expected, the skill premium is higher in North and the wage of unskilled workers higher 
in Germany. In addition, the real income per capita is higher in Germany ( realy ) than in North 
( realy ). Finally, the ratio of exports on production is 55%. This rather high level is obtained 
because public services are not inserted in the model.    
 
Table 3. Values at the starting point 
NOw  NOw  NOLw  hp  hp   hP  ntp   ntp   P   P   NOLwr  .NOLwr
2.454 3 1.168 4.019 4 3.45 1.168 1 1.641 1.542 0.7115 0.648 
 
Table 3 (continuing) 
I  I  *I  realy # realy # x ## 
15.93 100 82.80 1.29 1.18 0.552 
     # realy ( realy ) is the real income per capita in Germany (North). ##Export/production ratio.  
 
5.4.2. Partial offshoring with full employment (Scenario OFE) 
 
We now make k to move from 0 (no-offshoring) to 1 (offshoring of all L-segments). 
Figures 7-8 depict the changes in the unskilled workers’ nominal ( Lw ) and real ( /Lw P  ) 
wages and in the skill premium. The moves in other variables ( I , I , I* , realy  and realy )  are 
available from the authors upon request.  
 
Figure 7. Unskilled workers’ wage (Scenario OFE): (a) nominal; (b) real 
      
 
Figures 8. The skill premium (Scenario OFE) 
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Offshoring results in a huge increase in the skill premium that moves from 2.45 up to 4.5. 
Both the nominal and real wages of unskilled workers decline. The decline in the real wage is 
however less intense because offshoring entails a decrease in prices.  
Finally, the increase in offshoring results in an increase in trade in relation to production, 
the exports/production ratio (x) moving from 0.55 up to 0.75. 
 
5.4.3. Offshoring with reservation wage (Scenario RW) 
 
We now suppose that there is a reservation wage in Germany, the value of which is 1w  . As 
previously, we make k move from 0 to 1 so as to depict the offshoring dynamics linked to the 
decrease in the offshore production cost. Then, the changes in variables are the same as those 
depicted in the previous Scenario OFE as long as the German unskilled labour wage at full 
employment is higher than w . From the moment when this full employment wage goes below 
w , unemployment emerges.  
Figures 9-11 depict the variations in the nominal and real wage of unskilled workers, in the 
skill premium, in unemployment and in the exports/production ratio. 
As expected, the skill premium continues to increase but at a slower pace once Germany 
attains the reservation wage, i.e., from the value w = 2.92 (Figure 10). This reflects the fact 
that, even if Lw  remains constant at value w , Hw  continues to increase because the rise in the 
demand for German skilled workers due to the decline in the price of the German varieties in 
sector h (as   decreases).  
It must be noted that, if the German unskilled workers’ nominal wage remains constant 
once it has reached the reservation wage, the related real wage increases. This reflects the 
decrease in the general price index linked to the decrease in  the price hp . 
Figure 11a depicts the unemployment rate of unskilled workers and Fig. 11b the total 
unemployment rate, i.e., the ratio of unskilled unemployed to total employment. The 
unemployment rate increases during the period of partial offshoring (k increasing up to 1) 
with reservation wage ( Lw w ) and decreases afterwards, i.e., once all segments LS  are 
offshored, as predicted by the theoretical approach (Proposition 5, point 2). This reflects the 
fact that the continuing rise in Hw  increases the demand for non-tradables, and thus 
employment in this sector.  
 
 
Figure 9. Unskilled workers’ wage (Scenario RW): (a) nominal; (b) real 
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and remains there for a time (i.e., the time for the unskilled wage OFELw  to become lower than 
the new reservation wage 'w ). In the more realistic case in which the decrease in the 
reservation wage is gradual and only a limited part of the already offshored segment are 
relocated to Germany, the variations in the skill premium and unemployment are depicted by 
the dashed curve in Figure 13 and 14.  
 
Figure 12. Unskilled workers’ wage (Sc. HR)         Figure 13. The Skill premium (Sc. HR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Unemployment rates (Scenario HR): (a) Unskilled workers; (b) Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Exports/production ratio (Scenario HR) 
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Three characteristics of the simulated development can be highlighted: 
1) As regard the skill premium, the curve in Figure 13 assuming the realistic scenario 
(dashed curve) reveals a profile which is very similar to the observed variation in inequality 
depicted in Figure 5 (Section 2.1).   
2) As regards unemployment, its huge decrease due to the lower reservation wage in the 
periods following the implementation of the labour market reforms can be seen as a key 
explanation of the feeble impact of the 2008 crisis upon employment in Germany, as depicted 
in Figure 1b (Section 2.1). There are of course other explanations, such as the choice of 
German firms to transitorily lower the working time of their employees rather than dismissing 
them. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of mini-jobs and temporary agency workers 
(Fig. 3a) show that the economic recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis had a 
limited impact on German employment. This suggests that, by lessening the wage the 
unemployed were prepared to accept (i.e., the reservation wage), the labour market reforms 
have created new jobs in non-tradable services and helped maintaining jobs that would have 
otherwise been outsourced abroad.  
Note that the fact that unemployment remains at a rather high level compared to what is 
observed in Germany can be explained by the fact that the public sector (representing about 
15% of the working population in Germany, with a proportion of skilled worker significantly 
higher than the average) is not included in our model.  
Finally and as before, the reduction in the offshore production cost entails a decrease in 
unemployment once all the segments LS  are offshored (Fig.14).   
3) As regards the exports/production ratio, the simulated scenario reproduces rather well 
the observed profile. The major increase in this ratio occurred before the Hartz reform 
whereas this ratio has stopped increasing from 2006. This is exactly what is predicted by our 
model. The ratio exports/production increases during the phase of offshoring with full 
employment. This increase speeds up when unskilled workers are paid the reservation wage 
w , and it successively decreases to rise again but moderately after the labour market reforms.   
Finally, the simulation also reveals that the lower reservation wage comes with a slow-
down of the rise in the weight of the non-tradable sector in total employment (Figure 
available upon request), which can be related to the observed slow-down in the increase in the 
share of the working population employed in services after the implementation of the Harz 
reforms. The slow-down in the rise of the weight of non-tradable services in employment, 
despite the increase in employment in this sector, reflects the fact that the labour market 
reform temporarily stops the offshoring dynamics and can even cause the return to Germany 
of certain unskilled segments already offshored, which augments employment in 
manufacturing.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
We firstly compare our results to the stylised facts highlighted in Section 2. We subsequently 
discuss the policy implications of our model. 
 
6.1. The model’s results facing observed facts 
We have developed a model in which the cost of producing offshore decreases with time. 
Unlike the usual explanation described in the introduction, the model generates variations in 
the skill premium (inequality), in unemployment, and in the export/production ratio that fit 
with observed facts. In addition, if the simple analytical framework developed in sections 3 
and 4 shows certain limits due to the one-shot jumps in unemployment and in the 
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exports/production ratio, the simulations performed from our extended model accurately 
replicate the sequence of observed facts.  
On top of this adequacy, the model reveals that the decrease in unemployment would have 
occurred even without the Harts reforms, although later and less intensively. This is because, 
if the offshore production cost continues decreasing after the full offshoring of segment LS , 
then the related rise in the wage of skilled workers makes them increase their demand for non-
tradable services, which lowers the unemployment of unskilled workers. Of course this 
unemployment reduction comes to an end (as well as the increase in the skill premium) when 
the offshore production cost stops decreasing.      
Finally the model provides an explanation for two additional observed facts: 
1) The stop of the increase in the exports on production ratio from 2003 whereas one could 
have expected a speeding up due to the impact of wage moderation on competitiveness on 
foreign markets.  
2) The slowdown of the rise in the share of the service sector in total employment that 
follows the Hartz reforms.  
In summary, the model provides a rather convincing picture of the main characteristics and 
mechanisms that compose the German experience since 1995.  
6.2. Policy implications 
In the scenario modelled in this paper, (i) firms decide to offshore their unskilled-intensive 
stage of production when the offshore production cost has sufficiently decreased, (ii) this 
generates a decrease in the unskilled labour wage as long as the latter is downward flexible, 
and (iii) this creates unemployment from the time when the unit cost of producing abroad has 
attained the German reservation wage. Then, labour market reforms that lessen the reservation 
wage permit to reduce unemployment by creating jobs in the non-tradable sector.  
One additional consequence of this strategy is that it generates inequality, which can make 
the least skilled to fall below the poverty line (the poverty rate has significantly increased in 
Germany since 1999, for both working and unemployed individuals). Low pay is the price for 
low unemployment, which may be considered as damaging7.   
We now tackle the following two issues: a) Is this ‘strategy’ applicable to other Eurozone 
countries? b) Is it possible to generate the same mechanism, i.e., job creation in the non-
tradable sector, without reducing the wage of the less skilled? 
 
6.2.1. Extension to other Eurozone countries 
We focus on Eurozone countries because, as they share the same currency, wage moderation 
is the only short term way to increase price-competitiveness amongst these countries.  
One frequent critique brought to the Hartz reforms is that it is a ‘beggar my neighbour’ 
policy8. If this is true, the implementation of similar reforms in other Eurozone countries 
could just set the record straight. However, this critique directly stems from the ‘usual’ 
diagnosis that wage moderation is the main driver of German competitiveness on foreign 
markets. In contrast, the ‘beggar my neighbour’ impact remains marginal if, according to our 
interpretation, the labour market reforms essentially act through the employment of low 
skilled workers in non-tradable services. 
Our model makes it possible to analyse the effects of such reforms in other Eurozone 
countries. First, offshoring begins in other countries when the cost of producing segment LS  
in the South attains the wage NOLw  corresponding to full employment without offshoring in 
                                                     
7  See Dumont (2013) and Hellier and Chusseau (2010) for analyses of the inequality-unemployment trade-off. 
8 E.g.: Interview of C. Lagarde in the Financial Times, March 14th 2010. 
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North (which has not been introduced in our model for the sake of simplification). From then 
on, the same story as displayed for Germany applies. As long as NOLw w   , unskilled 
workers’ wage decreases and the skill premium increases in North, which maintains full 
employment. Once   has reached the reservation wage w , the production of LS  is fully 
offshored and unemployment appears. As in the German scenario, a set of reforms that lowers 
the reservation wage typically allows reducing unemployment. It must however be noted that: 
1) As for Germany, this policy increases inequality, and the inequality-unemployment 
trade-off should be more intense in North than in Germany because North has a lower relative 
endowment of skilled workers.   
2) The catching up of German competitiveness in the H-intensive sector could take time 
because German firms benefit from the cost advantage linked to the fact that they were the 
first to outsource to the South. In fact, part of the decrease in the offshore production cost 
occurs in-the-firm, and the firms that offshore earlier benefit from higher cost reductions.  In 
addition, Germany benefits from a cost advantage when offshoring towards Central and 
Eastern European country, due to geographic and historical cultural proximity.      
6.2.2. Alternative policies 
In the short term, there is obviously a way to boost employment in the non-tradable sector 
without lessening wages. This consists in subsidising production in this sector and taxing the 
tradable goods to finance the subsidies. This could be implemented by modulating the value 
added tax or the social levies according to sectors. This strategy permits to increase the 
demand for non-tradables without lessening the reservation wage and without increasing 
inequality. Of course, this typically raises the levies on tradable goods, but this rise may be 
offset by cuts in the taxes on the non-tradable sector. A number of countries have attempted to 
increase their international competitiveness by lowering the cost of unskilled labour through 
both a decrease in wages and a decrease in the social contributions paid by firms on low 
wages, the related losses in levies being offset by an increase in the value added tax. A more 
targeted strategy that concentrates subsidies or decreases in contributions in the non-tradable 
services with a high elasticity of unskilled labour demand could prove to be more appropriate.  
In the longer term, it is clear that skill upgrading is an efficient means to prevent the 
offshoring-related rise in inequality. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the relative supply of 
unskilled labour reduces the skill premium. This provides an additional reason to prefer the 
sector-targeted policy to the low wage strategy. In fact, as revealed by a numerous literature, 
growing inequality tends to reduce human capital accumulation when the credit market is 
imperfect and education is costly (surveyed by Chusseau & Hellier, 2013). By impoverishing 
the low-skilled part of the working population, a policy that fosters inequality could be 
counterproductive in the longer term.       
In summary, short term subsidies to, or lower levies on, the unskilled-intensive non-
tradable sectors combined with an active pro-skill education and training policy could be an 
alternative strategy that avoids the inequality-unemployment trade-off that characterises the 
Hartz reforms.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
From a three-country general equilibrium model in which (i) production is segmented in the 
skill-intensive sector, (ii) there is a decreasing cost of producing offshore and (iii) there is a 
non-tradable sector, we have built a scenario that aims at portraying the key characteristics 
and mechanisms of the German experience since the mid-nineties. The model replicates the 
key observed facts and sequences characterising the German economy since 1995: 
 28
1) The model explains why Germany started offshoring earlier and more intensively than 
other advanced countries. 
2) The increase in competitiveness and in the exports/production ratio occurs before the 
setting of the labour market reform, and this comes with both higher inequality and higher 
unemployment.  
3) The implementation of the labour market reform that lowers the reservation wage allows 
reducing unemployment and increasing production by creating new and cheaper jobs in the 
non-tradable sector, and this comes with a decrease in the exports/production ratio and an 
increase in inequality.  
The model also predicts that the decrease in unemployment would have occurred even 
without the Hartz laws, but later and less intensively.  
The same strategy can obviously be applied in other Eurozone countries once their firms 
have started to offshore their unskilled intensives stages of production. However, the catching 
up of the German external competitiveness could be difficult and slow. This is because the 
first country whose firms decide to offshore benefits from a lasting cost advantage and 
Germany could have an offshoring cost that remains lower than that of other countries in 
Central European countries.   
In addition, the channel by which the labour market reform lessens unemployment and 
boosts production is the creation of jobs in non-tradable services. Based on this diagnosis, we 
have discussed the possibility to implement alternative policies that could act through this 
channel without increasing inequality.  
The increase in the production of non-tradables can actually be attained by subsidising or 
decreasing levies on non-tradable services and increasing taxes on tradable sectors, . Such a 
policy could lessen unemployment without rising inequality. Combined with training and skill 
upgrading, this pictures a strategy that permits to escape from the inequality-unemployment 
trade-off, both in the short and the longer term. The sources of employment linked to such a 
policy are potentially substantial given the growing needs linked to the rising age of the 
population, the expansion of female activity and the prevention and control of pollution in 
most advanced economies.  
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Appendix A. Equilibrium with no-offshoring (NO) & full employment 
 
Both segments of h and h   are fully produced in the related advanced country, i.e., without 
international outsourcing. 
Assuming perfect competition on the markets for goods and because of the Cobb-Douglas 
technology, we have 
1
1
1
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h
w wp A
 
 

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
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, and thus:   
1
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p w w
               (A1) 
 
Balanced trade in the South and determination of I* 
Balanced trade of the South allows defining I* in terms of I and .  
Let *iM   be the value of imports of good i by the South and *jX  the South’s exports of good j 
value. We have * * *h hhM M I   and * ( )l lX I I   . Balanced trade ( * * *l h hX M M   ) 
implies: 
* ( )l
h
I I I           (A2) 
Labour demands 
Demand is denoted by superscript d.  
From the non-tradable sectors. Because of zero profit, dnt nt L ntp Y w L   and dnt nt L ntp Y w L    . 
 Hence: 
/ /dnt nt nt L nt LL p Y w I w  ;  /dnt nt LL I w     
From the skill-intensive sectors. Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology and relations (4) 
and (5) in the text: 
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Demand for unskilled labour in each advanced country 
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Finally, inserting (A2) into the above relations: 
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I
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Balanced trade in Germany 
 
We now assume balanced trade in Germany. This  will determine a relationship between I and 
I . Note that, when trade is balanced in both the South and Germany, it is ipso facto balanced 
in the third country (North). 
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  because of (A2). Balanced trade 
l hhM M X   entails: 
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Equilibrium on labour markets, skill premia and unskilled labour wages 
 
Because of full employment, total incomes in Germany and North are: 
( )L H LI w L w H w L wH           (A6) 
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By inserting (A5), (A6) and (A7) into (A3) and (A4) yields (NO indicate the no-offshoring 
equilibrium):  
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By inserting (A1), and (A6) to (A10) into (A5): 
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Note that relation (A9) that determines North’s skill premium is always valid when North 
firms do not offshore and North stands at full employment.9 Hence, North’s skill premium will 
be denoted w  and equal to the value given by relation (A9) in all the stages of our scenario.    
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Appendix B. Full offshoring and full employment in Germany with Lw    
 
We determine the skill premium FOw   and the relative unskilled labour wage /
FO
L Lw w  at the 
conclusion of the offshoring dynamics with full employment in Germany, i.e., when the 
offshore cost   attains the German unskilled labour wage that ensures full employment when 
all German unskilled workers are employed in the non-tradable services. In this situation, the 
total German unskilled labour L is employed in sector nt at a wage equal to the offshore cost 
  and the segment LS of sector h is fully offshored to the South. We thus have FOLw  , 
where FO indicates the case of full offshoring and full employment. 
We suppose that segment LS  is produced in the South, then exported to Germany where it is 
combined with HS . Germany then exports good h produced from the combination of LS  and 
HS . Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology:    
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Demands for goods  
 
These are not changed by offshoring. Consequently: 
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Unskilled Labour demand in Germany 
 
From the sectors of non-tradables. Because of zero profit, and as the total of unskilled labour 
is employed in sector nt in Germany: 
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Skill premium in Germany 
 
The demand for nt, nt I , is equal to the supply of nt, nt nt LYp w L . As L HI w L w H  , this 
yields:   
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Remark: the German skill premium is always equal to 1 nt
nt
Lw
H


  when segment LS  is 
fully offshored, with L being the total unskilled labour employment.   
Finally note that FO NOw w :  (1 )(1 ) 1(1 )
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NO FO
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Skill premium in North 
As North does not outsource segment LS  and is at full employment, Relation (A9) applies:  
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Note that the ratio of the skill premium in Germany to the skill premium in North is higher in 
the case FO than in the case NO (no offshoring):  
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Balanced trade in the South and determination of I* 
 
Balanced trade in the South allows defining I* in terms of  I and I .  
Let M* and *iM  be respectively the values of the South total imports and imports of good i, 
and X* and *jX  the values of the South total exports and exports of good j.  
The South imports goods h and h . Hence: 
* ** *h hhM M M I    
The South total export is * ** l SLX X X   
* ( )l lX I I    and ** 1SL SL HX L w H
     because of the Cobb-Douglas technology. 
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Balanced trade implies X* = M*. By inserting the above relations in this equality: 
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Balanced trade in Germany and determination of   
FO
FO L
L L
ω w=
w w
 
Germany exports the final good h (including both segments) and imports (i) the total of 
segment LS  from the South, (ii) good l from the South and (iii) good h  from the North. 
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Balanced trade implies l SL hhM M M X   , i.e.: 
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And after re-arranging: 
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Inserting (B4), (B1), (B3) and (A9) into the preceding equation: 
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Appendix C. Partial offshoring with full employment (OFE) 
 
The decrease in the offshore cost results in a growing share of segment LS  that is offshored to 
the South from the moment when the offshore cost   attains the German unskilled labour 
wage Lw . The wage of unskilled labour in North is taken as numéraire (we could write 1Lw   
but we prefer to keep Lw into the equations to facilitate their understanding. Hence, we make 
the cost of producing offshore / Lw  decrease from 
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   . This situation of (partial) 
offshoring with full employment in Germany is denote OFE. 
Because of full employment and partial outsourcing, we have:  
Lw           (C1) 
Because of the Cobb-Douglas technologies: 
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Skill premium in North 
 
As North's firms do not outsource and North is at full employment, relation (A9) applies: 
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Balanced trade in the South 
 
Imports of the South: * * * *h hhM M M I     
 
Exports of the South:  * * * ( ) *l SL l LX X X I I S      , 
 
where *LS  is the portion of the unskilled-intensive segment of h which is relocated to the 
South and fully exported to Germany to be combined with segment  to produce h.  
Let  be the complete unskilled-intensive segment (concurrently produced by the South and 
Germany) and  the part of  produced in Germany. Hence: 
 * WL L LS S S   
Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
1
W
L h h HS p Y w H
      
As we stand at full employment, dL
d
nh tS L L L   , and: 
 /L Lnt nt ntL IS L S IL L          
Hence: 
*
1
W
nL L L H tS S S w H L I
          
 
And for the total exports from the South: 
* ( ) ( )
1 1l H H nlnt t
IX I I w H L I I w H L I   
               
 
Equalising * *M X : 
* (1
1
)h l H hI I w H IL            (C4) 
 
Balanced trade in North and relation between / Lw   and OFEw    
North exports good h . Because of relation (7) in the text: 1
( *)
( / ) 1
h
h
hh
I IX X
a p p 


   
  .  
Inserting (C4) and as HI L w H   : 
1( / 1
1
)
1
h
l H
h
X
a p
I
p
w H
 
 






  
 
HS
W
LS
LS
W
LS
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North imports goods l and h: l hM M M    . We know that l lM I   and Relation (6) 
implies: 1( / )h
h
h h
a I
a p p
M

 

 
  . Hence:  
1( / )h
l
h
h
a I
a
M I
p p

 
   
     
Balanced trade ( MX   ) can thus be written: 
1
1 1
( / )
( / ) 1
1
1
( / ) 1
h hh
h hh
l H
h
l
I w a p p I
a p p a p p
H
I
 
   
  

 
   

 
   
 
Inserting (C2) and (C3) and after re-arranging: 
 
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
OFE
nt L
L Hw a
wH H
           
  
                 


 
    (C5) 
And: 
1
1(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) 0
( / ) (1 ) (1 )
OFE nt
L nt L
w a L H
w wH H
 
         
      
                       
 
   
Hence, 0
( / )
PO
L
w
w
    and:  
 
Result C. The decrease in ( / )Lw   induces an increase in OFEw .  
 
Appendix D. Reservation wage & Unemployment 
 
w   is the reservation wage and RWw  the reservation skill premium in Germany 
We suppose that the German reservation wage is higher than the cost of unskilled labour in 
the outsourced segment LS , w  , and higher than the full employment unskilled labour 
wage with full outsourcing of LS , 
FO
Lw w . Thus, Germany fully outsources the unskilled 
segment LS  of the production of h whereas this segment is still domestically produced in 
North. Then, German unskilled workers are only employed by the non-tradable sector and the 
demand for non-tradables is determined by the reservation wage. As this wage is higher than 
that which ensures full employment within this production configuration, FOLw , this generates 
unemployment.  
Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology:    
1
1
1
H
h
wp A
 
 

           ;  
1
1
1
H L
h
w wp A
 
 

           
 
 
And:   
1
h RW
RW Lh
p w w
p w w w
                        (D1) 
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Unskilled Labour demand in Germany 
 
The total of the German unskilled labour is employed in sector nt. Hence:
/nt nt nt nt nt ntwL p Y I L I w      and /RW nt RW ntL L L I w   .  As ( )RW RWI w L w H  : 
1
nt
RW RW
nt
L w H           (D2)  
Skill premium in North 
As usual, relation (A9) applies: 
 (1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
nt
Lw
H
 
  
   
          
 
Balanced trade in the South and determination of I*  
Balanced trade of the South allows defining I* in terms of  I and I . Let *iM  be the import of 
good i by the South and *jX  the South’s exports of good j. we have: 
Imports: 
* ** *  h hhM M M I    
Exports: 
***   l SLX X X   ; * ( )l lX I I    
As RWw   , segment LS  is fully produced in the South. Hence: * * 1SL SL HX L w H
     
because of the Cobb-Douglas technology. Hence: 
*** ( )
1l SL l H
X X X I I w H        
Balanced trade implies X* = M*. By inserting the relations above in this equality: 
* ( )
1h l H
I I I w H             (D3) 
 
Balanced trade in North and determination of the skill premium RWw   
Exports: North exports good h  : 1 1
( )( *) 1
( / ) 1 ( / ) 1
h l l H
h
h hh h
h
I I w HI I
a p p a p
X X
p   
   
   
   
   

   
Imports: North imports goods l and h:  11 ( / )
h
l h l
h h
IM M M I
a p p 
       
     
Balanced trade: 1 1
( )
1
( / ) 1 1 ( / )
h l l H
h
l
h hh h
I I w H IM I
a p p p
X
a p   
      
       
    
After simplifying: 1( / )
(1 )( )h Hh h l
I a p p I w H    
   
  
Inserting  HI wL w H   and L HI w L w H     , (D1), (D2) and (A9) into this equation: 
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1 ( 1)
(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt L
RW
nt
L H w ww a
H wH
             
   
                        
  
          (D4) 
As 
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
OFE
nt L
L Hw a
wH H
           
  
                 


 
  , then: 
( 1)
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) L L
RW OFE
w www w w
w
  
         
                      
 
, which is true by 
definition of Scenario RW. As RW OFEw w : 
 
Result D1: Assume a reservation wage w  such that w   and FOLw w . Then, the German 
skill premium with reservation wage is lower than the skill premium without. 
 
Result D2: The German skill premium RWw  decreases with both the reservation wage w   
and the offshore production cost   . 
 
Proof. Because  / 0RWw w    and / 0RWw    . 
 
Result D3. Assume a reservation wage w  such that w   and FOLw w . Then, there is 
unemployment of the German unskilled workers, and unemployment increases with the 
reservation wage w and decreases with the decrease in  . 
Proof. 
1
nt
RW RW
nt
L w H   (Equation D2) and 1
nt
FO
nt
L w H    (Equation B5). As 
RW OFE FOw w w   (Results C and D1), then RWL L : there is unemployment of unskilled 
workers. In addition, (i) RWw  decreases with the reservation wage w   and the offshore cost 
  (Result D2) and (ii) unemployment 
1
nt
RW RW
nt
U L L L w H       decreases with RWw . 
Hence, unemployment increases with the reservation wage w  and decreases with the decrease 
in  . 
 
The German total income 
The German total income is ( )RWI w L w H  . By inserting (D2) and (D6), it comes: 
(1 )( 1)( 1)
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )1
1 (1 )
nt
RW L
nt nt
HI a w L
H
                    
                 
    (D5) 
 
The German Exports/Income ratio (x = X/I) 
 
Firstly consider the moment when the declining offshore production cost attains the German 
reservation wage, i.e., w . At that time, there is a one-shot relocation to the South of the 
portion of segment LS  still produced in Germany. At the moment of this jump, the wages, and 
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thus the prices, remain unchanged. In contrast, (i) Germany’s total income decreases because 
the unskilled labour formerly utilised in the production of LS  becomes unemployed, (ii) the 
income of the South increase because of the relocation of  LS  in this country. Finally, the 
German exports of h increase10 (because of the income-driven increase in the demand from 
the South) and trade is balanced by the increase the German imports of segment LS . 
Consequently, both the decrease in the German income and the increase in German exports 
raise the Exports/Income ratio. Hence: 
 
Result D4. When the declining offshore production cost   attains the German reservation 
wage w , there is a downward jump of the Exports/Income ratio in Germany. 
 
Let us now calculate ratio x = X/I  so as to study its behaviour, (i) once the whole of segment 
LS  has been offshored because of the reservation wage, and (ii) when the German 
government set a labour market reform that lessens the reservation wage.  
   1
( *) /
1 ( / )
h
h
h
h
XXx I I I
p pI aI  

 

   

 
Inserting (D3), (D2) and (D1) into ;the preceding equation yields: 
( 1)(1 )( 1)
1(1 )
1 1
(1 )
l
nt
RW RW nt L
nt
RW
L L
L w H w
w H w H w
ww wa
x
w w w w
  

   
  
              
           

 
 

  
 
 
Inserting (D4) and w  in the relation above and after simplifying: 
 
   (1 )( 1)( 1)(1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
1
/ / 1
nt h
L
x
a w H H
          
 
 
      
   
  (D6) 
 
The derivative of x in relation to   is:  
   
(1 )( 1)
( 1) ( 1)(1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
2(1 )( 1)( 1)
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
( 1)
(1 )
0
/ / 1
h L
L
Ha w
H
a w H H
x
               
          
    


          
      
        
   
 




 
 
Result D5. Once the offshore cost is below the German reservation wage (hence segment LS  
is fully offshored), a decrease in the offshore cost lowers the export/production ratio.  
 
Let us now suppose a downward shift of the reservation wage w . If segment LS  remains fully 
offshored, relation (D6) still holds and there is no change in ratio x. In contrast, if the decrease 
                                                     
10 Note that the import-content of German exports increases because segment LS  is now fully offshored.   
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in w  is sufficient to make certain former offshored segments to be in-shored (i.e., relocated to 
Germany), which is the case when FOLw w   , then it is straightforward that the decrease 
in trade with the South results in a decrease in German exports.    
 
 Result D6. A decrease in the German reservation wage has no impact on ratio x=X/I when 
segment LS  remains fully offshored and it decreases this ratio when the new reservation 
wage is such that FOLw w   .   
 
Appendix E. Systems of equations for the simulations 
 
A comprehensive presentation of the building of the systems of equations is available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
1. No offshoring (Scenario NO) 
 
Skill premia 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
NO
nt
Lw
H
 
  
    ;    
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
nt
NO
nt
Lw
H
 
  
   
   
 
Unit wage of unskilled labour 
(1 )( 1)1/
/
/
NO
L L
L H Lw a w
L H L
  
 
         
    
Prices 
1
1
1(1 )
NO NO
h L
wp A w

  

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1
1
1(1 )Lh
wp wA

  

 
 ;    11 1 1h h hP a p p         
/  ;      /Lnt n Ltp pw w    ; l lp p   
 
l h nt nt l h nt
l h nt l h LP p P p p P w
          
 
l h nt nt l h nt
l h nt l h LP p P p p P w
            
 
Real wages of unskilled labour 
 1 nt
nt l h
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LNO
L
l h
w
wr
p P

  

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 1 nt
nt l h
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h
O L
L
l
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P p P
wr

  

 

  
 
2. Partial offshoring and full employment with  L kw   (Scenario OFE) 
 
k varies from 0 to 1.  7 equations with 7 unknown variables: w , w, Lw , I, I , I*, x. 
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